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RECENT CASE COMMENTS

the marriage,' it can allow W alimony pendente lite and attorney's
2
fees. Bell v. Bell.
The only case in West Virginia concerning alimony pendente
lite in an annulment suit was Meredithi v. Shakespeare,3 in which
the court on general equitable principles decided that since the
marriage was void ab initio no alimony pendente lite could be
allowed. The principal case is to be distinguished in that it was
decided under the present statute4 and not on general equitable
principles. It is clear that such allowances are granted in divorce
actions,5 but the controversial point is whether pendente lite
allowances will be granted in proceedings to annul a voidable
marriage under this section. The court, in the principal case, has
interpreted
the intent of the legislature to be that the word
'Zsuit" 6 includes not only divorce actions but also annulment proceedings. From the general language of the statute, it would
seem that the court was correct, in that this statute should apply
to annulment as well as divorce where the marriage is voidable.
H. P. S.
B. D. T.
TAXATION -

APPEAL FROm CIRCUIT COURT ON ISSUE OF VAL-

- P owned two tracts of unimproved mountain land,
eac of which prior to 1939 had been assessed for taxation at six
dollars per acre. That year the assessor raised, the value of the
larger tract to ten dollars per acre and of the smaller tract to fifteen
dollars per acre, and each of these assessments was approved by
the board of equalization and review. The circuit court sustained
the valuation of the larger tract and reduced that of the smaller
UATION.

I W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 48, art. 1, § 17.

28

S. E. (2d) 183 (W. Va. 1940).
3 97 W. Va. 514, 125 S. E. 374 (1924).
4 1 The court . ... may, at any time after commencement of the suit, and
reasonable notice to the man, make any order that may be proper to compel
the man to pay any sum necessary for the maintenance of the woman, and! to
enable her to carry on or defend the suit in the trial court and on appeal
should one be taken.. 1"W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 48, art. 2, § 13.

bid.

6 "The court... may, at any time after commencement of the suit ...
'00bd.; "The suit for annulling or affirming a marriage, or for divorce", id.
at c..48, art. 2, § 9; "No suit to annul or affirm a marriage shall be maintainable unless at the commencement of the su"it one of the parties is a bona
fide resident of this State .. .", id. at c. 48, art. 2, § 7. (Italics supplied.)
Reasoning by analogy the manner in which "1suit" is used in c. 48, art. 2,

§§

9 and 7, as including annulment as well as divorce, then when read in con-

nection with c. 48, art. 2, § 13, the term "suit"
ment as well as divorce.

would seem to include annul-
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tract to ten dollars per acre. Held, that an order of the circuit
court entered on an appeal from a decision of the board of equalization and review will not be reversed when supported by substantial evidence unless plainly wrong. Application of Sprinkle.The Code provides that the assessor shall fix the "true and
actual value ' 2 of the realty in his county. In its explanation as to
how this value is to be ascertained, 3 the legislature gives the assessor
broad powers of discretion since the test laid down offers, at best,
a zone with shadowed edges rather than a clearly defined black line
to distinguish the different factual setups.
After the assessor fixes, in his opinion, the true and actual
value of the land, the taxpayer who fancies himself to be aggrieved
may appear before the county court while it is acting as a board
of equalization and review and have the findings of the assessor
reviewed. 4 Within thirty days after the adjournment of the county
court, the taxpayer may apply for relief to the circuit court 5 if he
feels that the board of equalization and review has failed to correct
the allegedly faulty valuation.6 When the assessed value of the
property is fifty thousand dollars or more, the aggrieved taxpayer
Court of Appeals for a final decision
may appeal to the Supreme
7
on the issue of valuation.
An analysis of the cases8 that have been decided by the
supreme court since the enactment of the statute9 allowing appeal
seems to present the following results: first, the court is reluctant
to disturb values fixed by the taxing authorities and as a basis
111 S. E. (2d) 757 (W. Va. 1940).
2W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 11, art. 3, § 1.
3As defined by the legislators, the term "true and adual value" means
"at the price for which such property would sell if voluntarily offered for sale,
upon such terms as such property, the value of which is sought to be ascertained, is usually sold, and not the price which might 'be realized if such
property were sold at a forced sale." W. VA. CODEI (Michie, 1937) c. 11, art.

3, § 1.

4lcZ. at c. 11, art. 3, § 24.
5 . at c. 11, art. 3, § 25.
6 Although the code formerly provided for a board of equalization and
review, in 1933 this board was dispensed with and the county court acts in its

stead.

c. 11, art. 3, § 25.
8 Of the four cases which were appealed to the supreme court on the issue
7 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937)

of valuation only one, Crouch v. County Court of Wyoming County, 116 W.
Va. 476, 181 S. E. 819 (1935), held that there was sufficient evidence to reverse the findings of the lower court. In the other three cases, Liberty Coal
Co. v. Bassett, 108 W. Va. 293, 150 S. E. 745 (1929); Central Realty Co. v.
Board of Review, 110 W. Va. 437, 158 S. E. 537 (1931); and West Penn
Power Co. v. Board of Review, 112 W. Va. 442, 164 S. E. 862 (1932), the
court refused to change the findings of the lower court.
9 W. Y.a. Acts 1929, c. 55, lines 50-53.
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for refusal to interfere utilizes either the presumption that a public
official performs his duty correctly 0 or the reason that the true
and actual facts of the case are more in the "peculiar knowledge"
of the taxing authorities than the court. Second, in a proceeding to
reduce an assessment, the taxpayer must establish affirmatively
by clear and convincing proof that the judgment of the assessor
was erroneous. 1 Third, the assessment will not be disturbed unless it is so at variance with undisputed facts as to be in the eyes
of the law a fraud on the taxpayer's rights; the mistake must
apparently be more than merely patent-it must be "glaring."' 2
Fourth, all ambiguities will be so construed that the findings of the
taxing authorities will be upheld. Fifth, "...
it is not of consequence that another court could fairly arrive at a different conelusion... or that the weight of evidence is against the finding.
It is our duty to uphold the lower tribunal if there is sufficient
evidence for the foundation of its judgment, unless it is plainly
wrong."' 1 Sixth, although not "spelled out" in the cases, the
urgent need of revenue for governmental operation and the fact
that reversals might lead to an increase in frivolous litigation may
play an unassuming but none the less important role in the reluctancy to interfere with the valuation as set by the taxing
authorities.
Though some persons "doubt the right of the legislature to
clothe the courts with the authority and duty of reviewing assessments, 1 14 they must agree that the present case emphasizes the
principle, as laid down in prior cases, that there will be judicial
review. 15 Perhaps they may find consolation from the firmly
10 The presumption may be rebutted by proof to the contrary. Libory
Coal Co. v. Bassett, 108 W. Va. 293, 297,.150 S. E. 745 (1929).
.1Central Realty Co. v. Board of Review, 110 W. Va. 437, 439, 158 S. E.

5372 (1931).

Iu the only one of the appealed cases wherein the findings of the lower
court were reversed because of erroneous valuation, the mistake was very
apparent. In the Crouch &nse'the land was purchased in 1933 for $75,000.00.
For the years 1933 and 1934 the land was assessed at nearly $50,000.000 in
excess of that amount. (The court points out that valuation over the purchase price is not conclusive on the issue of improper valuation.) The assessment complained of was for the year 1934. No allowance had been made
for the removal of nearly $15,000.00 worth of 'timber in 1933. The mistake in
valuation in the beginning plus the refusal to deduct any amount for the
removal of some of the value of the land seem to make it obvious that a
readjustment of the value was necessary.
13 Liberty Coal Co. v. Bassett, 108 W. Va. 293, 295, 150 S. E. 745 (1929).
14 This quotation is from the opinion by Judge Maxwell in West Penn
Power Co. v. Board of Review, 112 W. Va. 442, 446, 164 S. E. 862 (1932).
15Davis, Judicial Beview of Administrative Action in West Virginia-A
.Study in Separation of Powers (1938) 44 W. VA. L. Q. 270. Mr. Davis

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1941

3

WestVIRGINIA
Virginia LawLAW
Review,QUARTERLY
Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1941], Art. 14
WEST
established doctrine that it takes a clear ease before the courts will
upset the findings of the taxing authorities, in reality the adninistrative body's findings are being given virtual finality.
E. E. T., Jr.
L. E. T., II.

TAXATiON INCO=. TAX - DEDUCTiONS. - In making his
state income tax return for 1937, T, a member of two mining
partnerships, deducted from his gross income his proportionate
share of the amounts paid that year by the partnerships to the
Federal Government on account of (1) old age benefits and unemployment compensation under the Social Security Act, and (2)
the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937; and to the state of West Virginia
on account of (1) unemployment insurance, and (2) gross sales
tax. Among the deductions allowed by the income tax statute of
19371 were: "1. Ordinary and necessary expenses . . . if paid for
or incurred during the tax year in . . . carrying on a trade or
business"; and "3. Income taxes payable to the United States upon
income earned in West Virginia; property taxes upon real and
personal property situated infthis state . . ." Held, that the taxpayer was not entitled to deductions respecting any of these four
items. Christopherv. James.2

Due to the fact that the statute expressly made income and
property taxes deductible, the court applied the rule of expressio
unius exctusio alterius to preclude the deduction of any other kind
of tax. In order to allow any of the four exactions as permissible
deductions it would therefore have been necessary to"find that they
were not taxes within the meaning of the statute, but deductible as
critically examines the cases concerning the right of judicial review upon the
question of valuation. As disclosed in the article, the cases have been
vacillating back and forth as to -whether valuation is properly a legislative
or judicial function. In the first case on the question, the action of the circuit
court was held to be "plainly ministerial and not judicial". Eighteen years
later the court declared that "the ascertainment of the values of property is
strictly judicial". Then just before the turn of the century the court held
the question of valuation to be of a legislative nature, but since 1929 the
cases have held that the question of valuation is again judicial and there
will be review by the courts.
1 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 11, art. 13B, § 25, (1), (3). This section
has been changed and now allows the deductions of the items under consideration. See V. VA. CODE (Michie Supp. 1939) c. 11, art. 13B, § 25.
2 12 S. E. (2d) 813 (W. Va. 1940).
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